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DISAGREEMENT ABOUT CHEVRON: IS 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW THE “LAW OF 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION”? 
ELIZABETH FISHER† AND SIDNEY SHAPIRO†† 
Should the US Supreme Court overturn the two-step test in 
Chevron?1 One group of judges2 and commentators3 perceive 
overthrowing Chevron as a battle for American constitutional 
democracy and a fight to ensure that judges are the ultimate arbiters of 
what law is. For another group, it just isn’t. From their perspective, 
Chevron and its variations4 involve the realities of judicial review that 
arise from the doctrinal complexities entangled in courts adjudicating 
on what is an acceptable interpretation of a statutory mandate.5 They 
point out that any doctrine that replaces Chevron will probably require 
a court to engage in a type of legal analysis similar to that which it is 
already carrying out because of the legal relevance of agency 
expertise.6  
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 1.  Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 2.  See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“Chevron deference raises serious separation-of-powers questions.”); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers 
Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1223 n.6 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Reflecting th[e] belief that 
bureaucrats might more effectively govern the country than the American people, the 
progressives ushered in significant expansions of the administrative state . . . .”); Gutierrez-
Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Chevron . . . 
permit[s] executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power 
and concentrate federal power in a way that seems more than a little difficult to square with the 
Constitution of the framers’ design.”). 
 3.  See generally Christopher J. Walker, Attacking Auer and Chevron Deference: A 
Literature Review, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103 (2018) (literature review). 
 4.  E.g., Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 
140 (1944). 
 5.  Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Future of Deference, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1297 
(2016) [hereinafter Pierce, The Future of Deference].  
 6.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Without Chevron, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 59, 79; Kristin E. 
Hickman, To Repudiate or Merely Curtail? Justice Gorsuch and Chevron Deference, 70 ALA. L. 
REV. 733, 737 (2019). 
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These disagreements amount to two different groups, who 
imagine administrative law in two completely different ways, talking 
past each other.7 Their disagreement cannot even be called a debate 
since each group employs a different vocabulary and preoccupation. 
Nor is it a political disagreement either. While the ideological roots of 
some of those who wish to overturn Chevron are quite obvious,8 their 
dislike of the doctrine also stems from assumptions about what the law 
should be.9 By comparison, those who see Chevron as doctrinally 
inevitable are ideologically and methodologically diverse.10  
What is not recognized is this: The root cause of disagreements 
about overruling Chevron is whether administrative law is to be the law 
of public administration. When administrative law is the “law of public 
administration,” it addresses the competence of agencies to fulfill their 
statutory duties. A competent agency has the legal authority to act as 
well as the capacity to fulfill the legislative mission that Congress has 
assigned to it. Historically, administrative law has focused on both of 
these concerns, but many administrative lawyers since the 1970s have 
adopted a narrower understanding, one that maintains that the sole 
purpose of this area of law is the constraint of administrative agencies.11  
This exclusive focus on constraint has resulted in the anti-Chevron 
movement that considers the legal significance of administrative 
competence in terms that are far narrower than those that are in the 
evidence from the administrative history of the United States. This 
narrowing has also affected those who recognize the value of the 
Chevron doctrine. They have been unable to articulate the legal 
significance of administrative competence to the retention of the 
doctrine because of the exclusive focus on constraint in contemporary 
administrative law.  
 
 7.  For an attempt to intersect, see generally Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Law, 107 GEO. 
L.J. 1613 (2019) [hereinafter Sunstein, Chevron as Law] (engaging with the arguments of 
contemporaneous critics of Chevron). 
 8.  E.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, THE DUBIOUS MORALITY OF THE MODERN 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, pt. 3 (2020). There have been ideological shifts in anti-Chevron thinking 
over time, however. Id. at 1618.  
 9.  Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2120, 2154 
(2016); Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Neoclassical Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 852, 854–55 
(2020). 
 10.  E.g., Nicholas R. Bednar, What To Do About Chevron—Nothing, 72 VAND. L. REV. EN 
BANC 151, 153–54 (2019); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of 
the Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 516–17.  
 11.  ELIZABETH FISHER & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, ADMINISTRATIVE COMPETENCE: 
REIMAGINING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 9, 23 (2020). 
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Our Essay shows how the recognition of administrative law as 
addressing both the capacity and authority of agencies not only 
explains what is behind the disagreement about jettisoning or retaining 
Chevron, it also offers a constructive way forward to think about 
judicial review of statutory interpretation. Parts I and II consider the 
arguments for and against overturning Chevron. Part III explains why 
we believe that the focus in administrative law should be on the 
competence of public administration. While administrative lawyers 
might regard the idea of administrative competence as strange, Part IV 
provides a brief account of the rich history of the idea. In Part V, we 
show that the administrative law imagination has narrowed so as to 
exclude ideas about administrative competence in the last forty years. 
We then demonstrate how administrative competence is legally 
relevant to both steps in applying Chevron. Finally, Part VI considers 
three implications of understanding Chevron as partially driven by 
administrative competence. We note that how a judge approaches 
Chevron is influenced by whether the judge has a narrow or a robust 
understanding of administrative competence. We take issue with the 
adoption of bright-line rules for statutory interpretation, including the 
Chevron two-step test, and argue that the real challenge in statutory 
interpretation does not concern governing agencies but instead 
requires governing of the lower courts.12 
I.  REASONS FOR OVERRULING CHEVRON 
The Chevron test is well known and included in every U.S. 
administrative law textbook: 
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it 
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the 
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of 
the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court 
determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question 
at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the 
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative 
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with 
 
 12.  This is an exploratory Essay. Readers can consult our recent book for a more detailed 
account of administrative competence and its specific relevance to the Chevron doctrine. See 
generally id. (describing our theory of how administrative law should incorporate understandings 
of competence). More importantly, we hope that this Essay will encourage readers to read the 
case law in a new light.  
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respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the 
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.13 
Since the case was decided, this two-step test has attracted 
considerable academic scrutiny.14 That is inevitable, given that a court’s 
review of an agency’s construction of a statute is practically important, 
and also conceptually challenging in that it requires an engagement 
with both law and administration. However, reliance on Chevron has 
become more polarized and heated in the last five years primarily due 
to the emergence of a group of scholars and lawyers who are animated 
by a dual concern for upholding law and limiting administrative 
power.15  
The concern for upholding law has focused on (1) stopping public 
administration from “impermissibly supplanting the judiciary’s 
constitutional duty to independently say what the law is (Article III 
concerns),” and (2) “[dis]couraging members of Congress [from] over-
delegat[ing] broad lawmaking authority to federal agencies in tension 
with nondelegation values (Article I concerns).”16 Justice Clarence 
Thomas, for example, argues that the Chevron doctrine “wrests from 
Courts the ultimate interpretative authority to ‘say what the law is.’”17 
And referencing § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”),18 Justice Neil Gorsuch has stated that the APA’s 
“unqualified command requires the court to determine legal 
questions—including questions about a regulation’s meaning—by its 
own lights, not by those of political appointees or bureaucrats who may 
even be self-interested litigants in the case at hand.”19  
For these critics of Chevron, law is something pure, and its purity 
must be maintained. Chevron deference puts at risk that purity. 
Professor Richard Epstein, for example, describes the Chevron 
 
 13.  Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 14.  Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and 
“Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1144 (2012) [hereinafter Strauss, “Deference” Is 
Too Confusing]; Thomas W. Merrill, Justice Stevens and the Chevron Puzzle, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 
551, 553 (2012) (noting Chevron has been cited in over 8,009 articles). 
 15.  Jamelle C. Sharpe, Delegation and Its Discontents, 64 WAYNE L. REV. 185, 187 (2018). 
 16.  Walker, supra note 3, at 113; see also Edwin E. Huddleson, Chevron Under Siege, 58 U. 
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 17, 23–31 (2019) (describing the main critiques of Chevron doctrine). 
 17.  Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). 
 18.  Pub. L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 
U.S.C.).  
 19.  Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2432 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
2021] THE LAW OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 115 
doctrine as an “abject neglect of legal duty.”20 For Professor Phillip 
Hamburger, it “is contrary to the very nature of American 
constitutional law to suggest that judges should lighten up when the 
government acts outside the structures of power established by the 
Constitution.”21 Ultimately, these critics believe that Chevron allows 
agencies to distort this true and independent meaning of the law. 
The second concern, about administrative power, exists because 
the Chevron doctrine is perceived as giving too much power to the 
administrative state.22 Chief Justice John Roberts has noted, for 
example, his anxiety has been “heightened, not diminished, by the 
dramatic shift in power over the last 50 years from Congress to the 
Executive—a shift effected through the administrative agencies.”23 Or 
take Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s observation, writing before his 
elevation to the Supreme Court, that “[i]n many ways, Chevron is 
nothing more than a judicially orchestrated shift of power from 
Congress to the Executive Branch.”24 Public administration, if it is to 
exist, therefore must be kept reined in so as to protect law. As 
Professor Cass Sunstein has noted, “some of Chevron’s contemporary 
critics are in the grip of a picture” that Chevron is a “green light to 
lawlessness.”25 Since these objections are more focused on where 
power lies than a judge’s fidelity to the Constitution, they can come 
across as more ideological.26  
For those who argue for the overruling of Chevron, the capacity 
of agencies to fulfill their statutory mission does not figure into their 
legal imagination. By “legal imagination,” we mean the collective 
mental constructs that are deployed by lawyers and legal scholars in 
thinking about law and how it operates. As Professor James Boyd 
White once observed, the “life of imagination work[s] with inherited 
materials and against inherited constraints.”27 “The greatest power of 
law,” he continued, “lies not in particular rules or decisions but . . . in 
 
 20.  EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 4. 
 21.  Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1187, 1226 (2016). 
 22.  Ronald A. Cass, Vive la Deference?: Rethinking the Balance Between Administrative and 
Judicial Discretion, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1294, 1316 (2015). 
 23.  City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 327 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 24.  Kavanaugh, supra note 9, at 2150. 
 25.  Sunstein, Chevron as Law, supra note 7, at 1667–68. 
 26.  Cass Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The New Coke: On the Plural Aims of Administrative 
Law, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 41; Cass Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative 
Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 393, 398 (2015). 
 27.  JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION xii (1973). 
116  DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE [Vol. 70:111 
the way it structures sensibility and vision.”28 As we will see below, 
expansion of legal imagination, by comparison, allows for 
consideration of how an agency’s capacity as well as authority relates 
to administrative law issues.  
Since public administration is not part of how this group imagines 
administrative law, it has no legal relevance. Take, for example, 
Epstein’s critique of the second step of Chevron. He asks, “[W]hy is it 
that the insertion of an administrative agency requires a fundamental 
revision of responsibility on key questions of statutory construction?”29 
For Epstein, the answer is “the same devices needed to deal with 
private law disputes also work for legislative and administrative actions 
as well as constitutional theory.”30 That is, there are only legal issues 
subject to review by judges without regard to the role of administrative 
agencies in our system of government. There is therefore no need to 
engage in any form of deference to an agency’s construction of a 
statute.  
This approach to Chevron “is heavily constitutional, marked by a 
formalist and originalist approach to the separation of powers, a deep 
distrust of bureaucracy, and a strong turn to the courts to protect 
individuals against administrative excess and restore the original 
constitutional order.”31 In short, as Professor Gillian Metzger has 
noted, anti-Chevron thinking is “anti-administrativist.”32  
A good example, is Justice Gorsuch’s view of the role of public 
administration expressed in his dissenting opinion in Gundy v. United 
States,33 which addressed whether the statute being challenged had laid 
down an intelligible principle for delegation to the Attorney General:  
To determine whether a statute provides an intelligible principle [for 
delegation], we must ask: Does the statute assign to the executive only 
the responsibility to make factual findings? Does it set forth the facts 
that the executive must consider and the criteria against which to 
measure them? And most importantly, did Congress, and not the 
Executive Branch, make the policy judgments? Only then can we 
 
 28.  Id. at xiii.  
 29.  EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 90.  
 30.  Id. at 97.  
 31.  Gillian E. Metzger, The Roberts Court and Administrative Law, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 3 
[hereinafter Metzger, The Roberts Court].  
 32.  Gillian E. Metzger, 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 3–4, 33–46 (2017). 
 33.  Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019). 
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fairly say that a statute contains the kind of intelligible principle the 
Constitution demands.34 
This is an eye-wateringly narrow vision of the role of 
administrative institutions in executing public policy. But it is a natural 
consequence of thinking of law in the way described above.  
For those seeking to overturn Chevron, law is a fixed and eternal 
restraint. The emphasis is on “limited government.”35 The starting 
point for this argument is a certain vision of constitutional law and an 
assumption about the dominance of the common law.36 Law is law is 
law.  
II.  ARGUMENTS AGAINST OVERRULING CHEVRON 
Those recognizing the validity of Chevron, by comparison, 
understand law as a thicker set of legal reasoning processes in which 
administrative knowledge has legal relevance. They are not so much 
defending Chevron as pointing out the inevitability of agency 
interpretation being legally germane to determining what the law is.37 
They find there is room for more nuanced thinking about how courts 
review agency interpretations in a variety of settings,38 and even room 
for doctrinal reform,39 but they also find the arguments for 
overthrowing Chevron misplaced. As Professors Nicholas Bednar and 
Kristin Hickman note, “[C]asting Chevron as administrative law’s 
bogeyman has always been a bit overwrought.”40 
These scholars understand administrative knowledge as having 
legal relevance based on pragmatic and functional grounds,41 which 
include the “comparative institutional advantages of agencies”42 and 
 
 34.  Id. at 2141 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 35.  Douglas H. Ginsburg & Steven Menashi, Our Illiberal Administrative Law, 10 N.Y.U. 
J.L. & LIBERTY 475, 477 (2016). 
 36.  D. A. Candeub, Tyranny and Administrative Law, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 49, 61 (2017).  
 37.  Sunstein, Chevron as Law, supra note 7, at 1670.  
 38.  E.g., Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing, supra note 14, at 1143; Peter L. Strauss, A 
Softer, Simpler View of Chevron, 43 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 7, 8 (2018); Cary Coglianese, 
Chevron’s Interstitial Steps, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1339, 1339 (2017); Kristin E. Hickman & 
Aaron L. Nielson, Narrowing Chevron’s Domain, 70 DUKE L.J. 931, 936–39 (2021). 
 39.  Richard W. Murphy, Abandon Chevron and Modernize Stare Decisis for the 
Administrative State, 69 ALA. L. REV. 1, 8 (2017). 
 40.  Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1392, 1461 (2017). 
 41.  Metzger, The Roberts Court, supra note 31, at 45–46; Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s 
Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1320 (2008). 
 42.  Pierce, The Future of Deference, supra note 5, at 1313; see also Stephen Breyer, The 
Executive Branch, Administrative Action, and Comparative Expertise, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2189, 
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“the virtues of placing interpretive decisions in the hands of 
accountable and knowledgeable administrators.”43 As Sunstein notes 
regarding § 706 of the APA:  
The text of the APA does not resolve the Chevron question. It is true 
that courts “shall decide all relevant questions of law,” but the right 
way to decide those questions might be to consult the agency’s view 
and to accept it so long as it is reasonable. One more time: Perhaps 
the law means what the agency says it means (so long as it is 
ambiguous).44 
This group also acknowledges the nuance, malleability, and 
inevitability of the doctrine as reflected in case law.45 Professor Evan 
Criddle notes, for example, that Chevron “offered a new vision of 
continuous, flexible, agency-directed statutory administration.”46 By 
comparison, much of the criticism of the anti-Chevron movement 
focuses on the doctrine as a “hornbook doctrine” of judicial review 
rather than the doctrine as it is actually applied.47 As Bednar and 
Hickman sum up, Chevron is “first and foremost, just a standard of 
review,”48 and “standards of review generally do not determine case 
outcomes. In the vast majority of cases, judicial evaluation of statutory 
text, history, and purpose—not Chevron—determines whether courts 
uphold an agency’s interpretation of a statute.”49 
What is notable of these defenders is that, unlike those who wish 
to do away with Chevron, they do not resort to first principles; they do 
not offer an overarching or theoretical explanation of why Chevron 
matters. Their defense, as noted, is functional and pragmatic. They 
recognize the legal relevance of administrative expertise, but they are 
left with a conundrum. If the focus of administrative law is on 
constraining agencies, as is generally assumed, why does administrative 
expertise matter? Why is it legally relevant that institutions can and 
 
2193 (2011) (“Courts find the notion of comparative expertise useful, indeed necessary, when 
reviewing administrative decisions.”); Metzger, The Roberts Court, supra note 31, at 43–44 (noting 
that “agencies’ greater political accountability, expertise, or congressional authorization” creates 
a “push toward deference in law application, which easily spills over into law interpretation.”).  
 43.  David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 
201, 223. 
 44.  Sunstein, Chevron as Law, supra note 7, at 1642 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).  
 45.  See supra notes 37–40.  
 46.  Criddle, supra note 41, at 1282.  
 47.  Pojanowski, supra note 9, at 856. 
 48.  Bednar & Hickman, supra note 40, at 1398. 
 49.  Id. at 1444.  
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usually do host a complex institutional environment of expert public 
administration? 
As we explain next, the capacity of agencies is legally relevant 
because administrative law is about the capacity and authority of public 
administration—that is, its “competence.” This understanding dates 
back to the Founding period and continues to this day, although it has 
been overshadowed by the contemporary assumption that 
administrative law is all about constraining administrative power. 
Chevron itself reflects this focus on capacity and authority of agencies. 
Those who support retaining Chevron recognize this association 
although they lack the means to express it. Those who oppose Chevron 
maintain that administrative law is only about constraint.  
III.  ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AS THE LAW OF PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION 
Administrative law is essentially the law of public administration. 
It constitutes, limits, and holds public administration to account. In 
doing these things, it is concerned with the “competence” of public 
administration, that is, its capacity to act and its authority to do so. The 
reason is straightforward. Congress creates agencies for their capacity 
to do things with authority, and they must thus be “[s]uitable, fit, 
appropriate, proper” and “[p]ossess[] the requisite qualifications”50 to 
act legitimately, and thus legally, in relation to a particular issue.  
Administrative competence exists because government cannot be 
done through the articulation of rules alone. It requires expert 
administrative capacity—not only to execute a set of legislative 
mandates, but also to articulate what those mandates mean. American 
citizens expect government to strengthen the economy, ensure safe 
food, alleviate poverty, and much else.51 Institutional capacity 
transforms expectations such as those for clean water, clean air, and 
safe workplaces into realizable realities. An institutional response is 
necessary in order to undertake functions such as collecting and 
assessing information; considering specific circumstances while 
applying general principles; and/or the need for dynamic 
 
 50.  3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 603–04 (2d ed. 1989).  
 51.  See Beyond Distrust: How Americans View Their Government, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 
23, 2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2015/11/23/beyond-distrust-how-americans-view-
their-government [https://perma.cc/WB2Q-UJ9A] (finding that “[o]verwhelming numbers” of 
Republicans and Democrats expected the government to play some role in thirteen areas, 
including “ensuring safe food,” “strengthening the economy,” and “helping people get out of 
poverty”). 
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decisionmaking, among other things.52 This is why Congress establishes 
an agency as a set of coordinated types of expertise that can be 
marshalled to determine how an agency’s mandate is to be fulfilled.53  
From a descriptive perspective, the recognition of competence 
accurately reflects the reality of the law. As noted above, law 
constitutes and empowers public administration. It is clear then that an 
understanding of the institutions that this area of law governs should 
be at its core. Those who teach corporation law would not presume that 
courts should interpret the law without any appreciation of the 
institutional arrangements that encompass a corporation. Those 
supporting Chevron are implicitly pointing to that fact in the context of 
agencies. They are not so much making an ideological argument for the 
administrative state, but rather making an argument about a factual 
state of affairs.  
From a prescriptive perspective, the recognition of administrative 
law as the law of public administration acknowledges public 
administration and therefore the important role it plays in American 
democracy. The creation of an agency and its mission is an act of 
democratic will that government should address the problems or issues 
that gave rise to the legislation. The recognition that an agency’s 
legitimacy depends not only on whether it has legal authority to act, 
but also on whether it has the capacity to do what it is supposed to do, 
is not wishful thinking or aspiring to a utopia. It is making sure that the 
substantive and complex role that public administration does play is 
reflected in the law.  
The idea of administrative law as the law of public administration 
therefore reflects the expectations that the American people have of 
public administration—both that it does not have unbounded power 
and that it will be used for a set of purposes that the public expects to 
be accomplished. Administrative law, so imagined, ensures such 
capacity and authority by focusing on both of these elements of 
competence.  
When administrative law only focuses on constraining agencies, 
not enabling them, public administration flounders in achieving 
legislative mandates, which is anti-democratic. The legitimacy of public 
 
 52.  See ELIZABETH FISHER, RISK REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 19–22 (2007) (explaining the factors necessitating administrative body 
decisionmaking in the context of technological risk evaluation).  
 53.  See FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 40 (noting how President Richard Nixon’s 
comments reflected his view of the EPA’s capacity as including coordinating expertise, so that it 
could work with the states to “produce regulatory standards that were clear and consistent for 
regulated entities”). 
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administration depends not only on its legal authority to act, but also 
on the capacity to do so proficiently. 
Professor Jerry Mashaw has noted “‘competence’ can convey a 
concern for either ‘authority’ or ‘capacity.’”54 Regarding public 
administration, it refers to both.55 Both are necessary for the “law” of 
public administration. Legitimacy requires that an agency not exceed 
its legal authority, and that it is able to comply with the “law” that 
requires it to protect the public, the environment, or provide benefits 
to the public.  
The recognition that administrative law encompasses 
considerations of the competence of public administration comes with 
two challenges. The first is for administrative lawyers, as it requires 
them to think about administrative law in an institutional way that is 
alien to how the subject has been characterized for at least forty years. 
The second challenge is to recognize the diversity inherent in this body 
of law. Administrative and legal architecture will vary between 
legislative and administrative contexts. 
As Part IV will explain, the history of public administration dating 
back to the Founding shows a concern with both capacity and 
authority. It is only since the 1980s that the academic discussion has 
shifted so significantly to make constraint the exclusive focus of 
administrative law. This history, however, is unknown and 
unappreciated by many lawyers today who are accustomed to limiting 
how they imagine the role and purpose of administrative law. In order 
to reorient administrative law back to its long-standing concern with 
capacity and authority, the challenge is to reimagine administrative law 
despite long ingrained ideas about it.  
Once you acknowledge that administrative law is also about 
capacity, it is necessary to understand that capacity, which is the second 
challenge because of the diversity of the different types of 
administrative capacity that exist. The Clean Water Act provides a 
different set of interpretative issues than the Clean Air Act (“CAA”).56 
The Federal Communications Commission is a distinct type of 
administrative institution from the Environmental Protection Agency 
 
 54.  Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry 
into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 504–05 (2005). 
 55.  FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at ch. 1.  
 56.  Compare Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 859–64 
(1984) (considering the statutory text and legislative history of the CAA, as well as the EPA’s 
interpretation, to interpret the term “stationary source” in the CAA), with Rapanos v. United 
States, 547 U.S. 715, 731–39 (2006) (applying canons of textual interpretation to determine the 
meaning of “navigable waters” in the Clean Water Act).  
122  DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE [Vol. 70:111 
(“EPA”). This diversity is partly due to the nature of different types of 
problems that the administrative state administers: clean water, clean 
air, social security, and so on. It is also due to over 200 years of 
administrative evolution. As Justice Elena Kagan commented in her 
dissent in Selia Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,57 
“Our history has stayed true to the Framers’ vision. Congress has 
accepted their invitation to experiment with administrative forms.”58  
Despite the need to understand the institutional capacity of 
agencies, the nature of expertise and its legal relevance remains 
elusive.59 In Chevron itself, Justice John Paul Stevens remained rather 
vague as to what he meant by agency expertise.60 A Westlaw search of 
the law review literature reveals almost no discussion of what expertise 
is or how it works inside of agencies.61 There is a general assumption 
that agencies have experts because they hire people with specialized 
training, but this is a very thin understanding of expertise. As we have 
shown previously, expertise is a far more complicated set of 
interrelated concepts and abilities.62  
An important aspect of these institutional arrangements is the 
generation of internal norms and processes that establish what is 
expected of agency employees and that define good decisionmaking.63 
Professional training, for example, includes a “code of conduct and 
emphasis on adherence to it” and a “feeling of ethical obligation to 
render service to clients . . . with emotional neutrality.”64 Adding to the 
internal motivation, professionals tend to this aspect of the education 
and training because their peers and other professional civil servants 
 
 57.  Selia L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020).  
 58.  Id. at 2245 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 59.  Sidney Shapiro & Elizabeth Fisher, Chevron and the Legitimacy of “Expert” Public 
Administration, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 465, 471–73 (2013). For exceptions, see EDWARD 
RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR THE MODERN STATE 117, 
138–39 (2005); Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH. L. 
REV. 1239, 1297 (2017) (“The judicial warrant for monitoring and regulating a wide swath of 
internal administrative law also reflects some degree of judicial distrust or ignorance of agencies’ 
capacities for self-governance.”).  
 60.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
 61.  Sidney A. Shapiro, The Failure To Understand Expertise in Administrative Law: The 
Problem and the Consequences, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1097, 1098 n.7 (2015). 
 62.  Id. at 1102–16; FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at ch. 2. 
 63.  FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at ch. 3; Sidney A. Shapiro, Why Administrative Law 
Misunderstands How Government Works: The Missing Institutional Analysis, 53 WASHBURN L.J., 
1, 5–8 (2013). 
 64.  HAL G. RAINEY, UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGING PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS 304–05 
(4th ed. 2009). 
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expect them to do so.65 While we cannot do justice to the nature of all 
of these arrangements here, we can point out that there is considerable 
evidence of their efficacy.66 
The lack of understanding of public administration as a diverse 
mixture of knowledge and accountability practices has led lawyers to 
understand their choices in binary terms. Controlling the 
administrative state is often viewed in conflict with public 
administration delivering on its mandates. From this perspective, if 
public administration is to be efficacious, it must be untrammeled by 
law; it must have space in which law does not interfere. While there are 
different variations of this binary, they all see the choice in 
administrative law as between two options: either to interfere with 
public administration or to leave it be. This choice is described in a 
variety of ways: as between “law’s abnegation”67 and the dominance of 
singular vision of the rule of law;68 as between rules and discretion;69 or 
as between deference and intensive review.70 
As the next Part explains, these binary understandings betray a 
long history of concerns about both administrative competence and 
authority although they reflect the more recent emphasis on constraint 
over the last forty years. Nevertheless, the conception of administrative 
law as fostering competence can still be found in more recent case law. 
As we will discuss later, Chevron itself reflects this older history of 
administrative law related to agency competence.  
IV.  ADMINISTRATIVE COMPETENCE OVER TIME 
Public administration “has had a prominent role, as both means 
and object, in every major effort at political and governmental reform 
associated with the political development of the United States.”71 And 
administrative competence has been a legal reality and aspiration of 
 
 65.  Hugh Heclo, OMB and the Presidency—The Problem of “Neutral Competence,” 38 PUB. 
INT. 80, 81–83, 92 (1975). 
 66.  Sidney A. Shapiro & Ronald F. Wright, The Future of the Administrative Presidency: 
Turning Administrative Law Inside-Out, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 599–603 (2011). 
 67.  See generally ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION: FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (2016). 
 68.  PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 7–9 (2014). 
 69.  See generally KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY 
INQUIRY (1969).  
 70.  Emily Hammond Meazell, Presidential Control, Expertise, and the Deference Dilemma, 
61 DUKE L.J. 1763, 1763–64 (2012) (emphasizing that the fidelity to statute and reasoned 
decisionmaking are touchpoints of judicial review to solve “deference dilemma”).  
 71.  BRIAN J. COOK, BUREAUCRACY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT 26 (2014). 
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American constitutional democracy since before the Founding.72 
While we cannot fully document this history in this Essay, this Part will 
provide a brief description that shows this long pedigree.73  
As a number of scholars have documented, attention to 
competence was part and parcel of the American experiment in the 
Founding and Federalist periods.74 After the Constitution was ratified, 
the Founders created new administrative structures to do the work of 
government.75 There were vigorous debates concerning how this was 
to be done, and the necessity of public administration and competence 
were “important themes in those debates.”76 
Once they were in charge of the government, President George 
Washington and his cabinet members fashioned reporting and 
management processes that fostered the capacity of government to act. 
In particular, the Founders sought to ensure that the new institutions 
would be staffed with people who could do their jobs. For this purpose 
they relied on the reputation of a person or “fitness of character” as a 
check on the honesty and competency of those who were hired.77 
As this brief description suggests, there was a “deadly fear of 
governmental impotence” particularly among the Federalists.78 The 
courts acted consistently with this concern by recognizing that 
Congress constituted a set of administrative departments (Department 
of Foreign Affairs, the Department of War, and the Department of the 
Treasury) to carry out the functions of government by considering both 
the capacity of the government to act and its authority to do so. This 
emphasis on competence can be seen even in Justice John Marshall’s 
statement in Marbury v Madison79 that “[i]t is emphatically the 
 
 72.  See FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at ch. 4; WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S 
WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 1 (1996); JERRY L. 
MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS 
OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 29–78 (2012); see generally LEONARD WHITE, THE 
FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY (1948). 
 73.  For a more complete description of this history, see FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 11, 
at pt. II.  
 74.  COOK, supra note 71, at ch. 2; JOHN A. ROHR, TO RUN A CONSTITUTION: THE 
LEGITIMACY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE chs. 2–4 (1986); MASHAW, supra note 72, at chs. 
2–4.  
 75.  FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 109–21.  
 76.  Id. at 119.  
 77.  Id. at 123–24.  
 78.  Leonard White, Public Administration Under the Federalists, 24 B.U. L. REV. 144, 180 
(1944). 
 79.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”80 
In order to answer one of the legal questions before the Court in that 
case—“Has the applicant a right to the commission he demands?”81—
the Court had to understand how the administrative process worked, 
including the way in which the roles of the president in signing the 
commission and the secretary of state in assigning a seal to it were fixed 
in law.82 This question also required the Court to determine whether 
the administrative process of communicating the commission to an 
individual was legally relevant or not.83  
In doing this, the Court considered the administrative competence 
of the Department of State through a “legal” lens.84 Given the Court’s 
analysis, it is no surprise that Professor Thomas Merrill has eloquently 
argued that the case is an administrative law decision.85 Marbury is 
“administrative law” because Chief Justice Marshall sought to 
understand how Congress meant for the commission process to work 
as a necessary step in determining the legality of Marbury’s 
commission.  
President Andrew Jackson and his successors overthrew the 
previous administration’s reliance on the appointment of men from the 
“natural aristocracy” as the most fit for ensuring the capacity of 
government.86 The Jacksonians assumed that any “able man” could 
undertake administrative duties,87 which seems like a move away from 
competence, but a driving logic behind these reforms was that it would 
deliver administrative accountability. Patronage was supposed to 
accomplish this by making public administration an arm of the 
Jacksonians’ political party, which would impose and maintain the 
proper constraints on public administration.88 It did nothing of the sort, 
of course, but the fact remains that the spoils system was a vision of 
competence, albeit a mistaken one. 
 
 80.  Id. at 177. 
 81.  Id. at 154. 
 82.  Id. at 143–47.  
 83.  Id. at 160.  
 84.  See supra notes 80–83. 
 85.  See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Marbury v. Madison as the First Great Administrative 
Law Decision, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 481 (2004) (defining the paradigm of an administrative 
law decision and explaining how Marbury fulfills this paradigm). 
 86.  MATTHEW A. CRENSON, THE FEDERAL MACHINE: BEGINNINGS OF BUREAUCRACY IN 
JACKSONIAN AMERICA 24, 27 (1975).  
 87.  FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 132. 
 88.  Id. at 131–32.  
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New ideas of administrative competence emerged during the 
Progressive Era. The “Progressives’ approach to governing,” as 
Professors Stephen Skowronek and Stephen Engel have noted, 
“informed successive waves of political innovation and embedded itself 
in the operations, assumptions, and expectations of the modern 
American state.”89 Different thinkers, particularly Herbert Croly, John 
Dewey, and Woodrow Wilson, expressed different concepts of how 
best to ensure the competence of public administration.90 Yet, a 
common understanding of this era is that the Progressives’ promotion 
of public administration was based on a commitment to “neutral 
competence” derived from objective science.91 It is true that the 
Progressives were deeply troubled by the impact of partisan politics on 
government,92 but their main preoccupation was on how to develop a 
robust concept of administrative competence in terms of both capacity 
and accountability in light of the lessons learned from the previous 
era.93  
Despite their reliance on expertise, the Progressives were not 
arguing that the capacity of the government required independence 
from political oversight as it is commonly assumed. Nor were they 
arguing that expertise would furnish its own legitimacy as suggested by 
Wilson’s proposal for a “science of administration” which would 
operate “outside the proper sphere of politics.”94 Rather, as Professor 
David Rosenbloom has argued, his aim was to separate public 
administration from partisan politics rather than a broader concept of 
politics per se.95 Wilson was reacting to the political corruption that had 
plagued the Jacksonians, but he also recognized the limitations of 
 
 89.  Stephen Skowronek & Stephen M. Engel, The Progressives’ Century, in THE 
PROGRESSIVES’ CENTURY: POLITICAL REFORM, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND THE 
MODERN AMERICAN STATE 1 (Stephen Skowronek, Stephen M. Engel & Bruce Ackerman eds., 
2016). 
 90.  FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 138–43. 
 91.  See Shapiro & Wright, supra note 66, at 597–98 (describing the viewpoint that 
systematically hiring administrative agency employees on the basis of expertise would render a 
scientifically efficient agency).  
 92.  See FRANK J. GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION 255 (1900) (drawing 
conclusions regarding the combination of centralized administration and a weak party system, 
and vice versa); see also David H. Rosenbloom, The Politics –Administration Dichotomy in U.S. 
Historical Context, 68 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 57, 57 (2008) (describing reformers’ belief in the 
necessary separation of administrative decisionmaking from partisan politics). 
 93.  See Brian J. Cook, Curing the Mischiefs of Faction in the American Administrative State, 
46 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 3, 3–4 (2016). 
 94.  Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197, 197, 210 (1887).  
 95.  Rosenbloom, supra note 92, at 57. 
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“administrative science” and was aware that public administration had 
to be responsive to democratic politics.96  
The New Deal did not produce a wholly original and virgin vision 
of competence in government, but instead was an evolution of all that 
had gone before. As in the Progressive era, New Dealers, such as Felix 
Frankfurter, James Landis, and Jerome Frank, offered a whole range 
of different administrative arrangements and thinking about 
administrative competence.97  
The report of the Attorney General’s Committee on 
Administrative Procedure, which was the capstone of this attention to 
administrative competence, is an exemplar of taking administrative 
competence seriously.98 With its detailed underlying reports of the 
types of problems with which administrative decisionmakers were 
dealing and the types of issues that emerged from such problems, the 
Committee understood the importance and variety of administrative 
structures used to grapple with the problems of the day. In short, it 
acknowledged the capacity of public administration and proposed 
administrative procedures that were crafted in accordance with that 
understanding.  
V.  THE NARROWING OF HOW WE UNDERSTAND ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW 
Our brief engagement with this history of the thinking about 
administrative competence cannot do justice to this rich past. But even 
this glimpse indicates how little of it fits into the binary narratives that 
we now tell about administrative law. Recognition of the long pedigree 
of administrative competence also underlines what administrative law 
is really about. It is the law of public administration, and in being so, it 
must directly relate to how public administration has developed in the 
United States.  
Ironically, the point at which scholars lost sight of administrative 
competence was the time during which it was most needed—the 
rulemaking revolution of the 1970s.99 During that era, reformers 
depended on government to regulate business, and they understood 
 
 96.  FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 138–41. 
 97.  Id. at 148–52. 
 98.  See generally ATT’Y GEN.’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROC., FINAL REPORT OF THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE (1941).  
 99.  FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at ch. 7. 
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the importance of administrative expertise to achieve this aim,100 but 
they were also dubious concerning the ability of the administrative 
status quo to administer new environmental, civil rights, health and 
safety, and other laws. To use Professor Andrew McFarland’s 
description, they were “civic skeptics.”101  
Their answer, as Professor Richard Stewart famously described 
this era, was the “reformation” of administrative law,102 which depicted 
administrative law as largely a body of law concerned with interest 
representation. It also fed the binary conception of administrative law 
as either following law or agency discretion. Stewart, for example, 
pointed to the “problem of discretion” as the central question in 
administrative law. The solution was to create an interest group system 
that enabled public interest groups to use the courts to hold the 
government accountable. In other words, interest representation was 
important because it was a form of control,103 and Stewart considered 
how the reformation set about making this happen.  
What is striking in Stewart’s article is that he makes no mention of 
how Congress had created legislative structures that required a new 
form of administrative capacity.104 The reformation was entirely a 
matter of creating rights of public interest participation in the 
administrative process that could neutralize the business advantage.105 
For Stewart and others, agencies had a blank check for discretionary 
decisionmaking unless they were limited by the constraints of public 
participation.106 Philip Harter, for example, pictured an agency as 
merely a “referee” among the “multitude of political forces [which] 
influence the decision.”107 As Bill Funk has objected, administrative 
competence had been sidelined.108  
 
 100.  See MICHAEL W. MCCANN, TAKING REFORM SERIOUSLY: PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC 
INTEREST LIBERALISM 78–79 (1986). 
 101.  ANDREW S. MCFARLAND, PUBLIC INTEREST LOBBIES: DECISION MAKING ON 
ENERGY 16–17 (1976). 
 102.  Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
1667, 1670 (1975). 
 103.  Sidney A. Shapiro, Law, Expertise and Rulemaking Legitimacy: Revisiting the 
Reformation, 49 ENV’T L. 661, 663 (2019). 
 104.  Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The “Reformation of Administrative Law” 
Revisited, 31 J.L., ECON., & ORG. 782, 788–89 (2015).  
 105.  Stewart, supra note 102.  
 106.  Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Law after the Counter-Reformation: Restoring Faith 
in Pragmatic Government, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 689, 694–95 (2000). 
 107.  Phillip Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for the Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 17 (1982). 
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Interest—EPA’s Woodstove Standards, 18 ENV’T L. 55, 90–91 (1987). 
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Deborah Stone, in what she has termed the “rationality project,” 
described the continued failure to engage with the actual institutional 
contexts of public administration by identifying and summarizing the 
range of accountability mechanisms that emerged after 1980.109 These 
accountability mechanisms require administrative agencies to justify 
their decisions using processes of closely bounded analysis.110 These 
developments have been widely praised and criticized in the literature. 
Our point here, however, is simply that the rationality project is a direct 
manifestation of understanding the choices in administrative law as 
only being between discretion and limiting that discretion.  
VI.  CHEVRON AND COMPETENCE 
Now let us return to the disagreement about Chevron. As 
discussed earlier, the dispute is between those who would overrule it 
because it is the duty and province of the courts to decide “legal” issues, 
and those who would retain it based on the legal inevitability of agency 
interpretation being legally relevant to determining what is the law. 
Both groups start with the current premise that the purpose of 
administrative law is to constrain public administration, and in light of 
this premise, the defenders lack a coherent explanation of why 
expertise is legally relevant except that it obviously takes place and can 
shed light on the meaning of ambiguous or vague statutory language. 
Once, however, the premise of administrative law as pursuing the 
competence of public administration is recognized, it is possible to 
move past this binary by showing that Chevron requires a judge to 
assess the nature of administrative competence at both Steps One and 
Two. When administrative law is thought of in this more holistic way, 
the legal relevance of administrative expertise is demonstrated. 
Take the rule that was the focus of Chevron. The “bubble policy” 
adopted by the EPA and at issue in the case undoubtedly reflected the 
new Reagan administration’s more flexible approach to 
administration,111 but it also was the product of the agency’s expert 
 
 109.  DEBORAH A. STONE, POLICY PARADOX: THE ART OF POLITICAL DECISION MAKING 
9–13 (3d ed. 1988). 
 110.  THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY 
ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 5–6 (1991). 
 111.  The EPA’s rule treated all emissions from a single plant as amounting to a single 
“statutory source,” or “bubble” under a provision of the Clean Air Act that required a permit 
from a state regulator before the construction of any “new or modified stationary sources” of 
pollution in states that had not attained air quality standards under previous legislation. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7502(b)(6) (Supp. I 1977). This permitted a plant to modify or install a piece of equipment that 
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capacity regarding how the CAA could be practically implemented. As 
Professor Tom McGarity has explained, the EPA rulemaking blends 
skills, knowledge, and experience about “the extent to which 
compliance with relevant regulations can be induced in the real 
world.”112 The agency explained that a definition of “stationary source” 
based on individual equipment acted “as a disincentive to new 
investment and modernization.”113 The EPA also stressed that the 
definition of “stationary source” could not be seen in isolation, but in 
a context where strict legal obligations were imposed on the states.114 
And they pointed out that there was a “lack of express statutory 
language” and “conflicting Congressional signals.”115 The resulting rule 
was thus a product of the EPA’s expert capacity.  
The conventional understanding of Chevron supports a 
bifurcation where Step One involves a judicial interpretation of the 
statutory language and Step Two requires deference to the agency’s 
statutory interpretation. The expert capacity of the EPA is thus only 
relevant at Step Two, and when it is, it displaces law. Sunstein, for 
example, argued in 1990: “For the [first Chevron step], strictly legal 
expertise seems relevant. For the [second Chevron step], it is the 
agency that has a comparative advantage.”116 This makes the case, as 
Sunstein also noted, a “kind of counter-Marbury” doctrine for the 
administrative state.117 Since this reading reinforces that binary 
discussed earlier, it is not surprising that the case has become a 
flashpoint for ideological battles.118 
The conventional understanding of the case, however, misses 
Justice Stevens’s understanding that legal questions of statutory 
construction are entangled with understandings of administrative 
competence and specifically expert capacity. In other words, 
understandings of administrative competence inform the overall 
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process of statutory interpretation at both Steps One and Two. Both 
steps require the court to assess the nature of the statute, 
administrative competence, and the reasons that an agency gave for 
their approach.  
At Step One, Justice Stevens’s opinion took specific note of the 
EPA’s capacity. He acknowledged that Congress left “gaps” in the 
statute and assigned the EPA the “power” to fill them,119 and found 
therefore that “considerable weight” should be given to “an executive 
department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to 
administer.”120 After a considerable discussion of legislative history, 
Justice Stevens described the 1977 Amendments as “a lengthy, 
detailed, technical, complex, and comprehensive response to a major 
social issue.”121 He went on to review the history of how the EPA had 
interpreted the word “source” and then concluded, “Our review of the 
EPA’s varying interpretations of the word ‘source’ . . . convinces us that 
the agency primarily responsible for administering this important 
legislation has consistently interpreted it flexibly—not in a sterile 
textual vacuum, but in the context of implementing policy decisions in 
a technical and complex arena.”122  
Step One is usually framed as a question of congressional intent, 
but it is actually a question about what type of institutional structure 
Congress created, which makes it an issue of administrative 
competence. When Justice Stevens analyzed the issue of what 
Congress expected the EPA to do under the Act, he was asking the 
question whether Congress established the capacity in the EPA to 
define “source” for purposes of the CAA. This inquiry was relevant to 
determining whether Congress had defined the term or delegated that 
power to the EPA. 
At Step Two, it is tempting to read Justice Stevens’s opinion as 
judicial deference to the EPA’s interpretation, and some of the 
language can be seen as supporting this view.123 Viewed this way, as 
noted earlier, the case supports a bifurcation that interprets Step One 
 
 119.  See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984). 
 120.  Id. at 844. 
 121.  Id. at 848. 
 122.  Id. at 863. 
 123.  Justice Stevens noted that “perhaps” Congress had not spoken precisely to the question 
at issue, “thinking that those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for 
administering the statute would be in a better position” to choose an appropriate policy. Id. at 
865. He also stated deference was appropriate in light of the agency’s political accountability. Id. 
at 865–66. And he acknowledged that courts did not have such competence. Id. at 866.  
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as a judicial interpretation of the statutory language and Step Two as 
requiring “deference” to the agency’s statutory interpretation.  
This characterization, however, misses Justice Stevens’s 
understanding that legal questions of statutory construction are 
entangled with understandings of administrative competence. In other 
words, understandings of administrative competence inform the 
overall process of statutory interpretation at both Steps One and Two. 
Both steps require the court to assess the nature of the statute, 
administrative competence, and the reasons that an agency gives for 
their approach. 
At Step Two, the common understanding is that a court will 
“defer” to the agency’s construction of the statute because Congress 
has delegated the resolution of an ambiguity to the agency. But Justice 
Stevens “deferred” only after he determined that the EPA had used its 
capacity for administrative expertise in a manner that produced a 
reasonable definition of the term “source.” The fact that the agency 
applied its capacity in a reasonable manner was therefore relevant to 
the legal issue of whether the resolution was “permissible.”124  
After Chevron was decided, the Supreme Court created what is 
now called “Step Zero” in which there is a preliminary determination 
of whether Chevron applies at all.125 If a court decides at Step Zero that 
Chevron does not apply, it avoids the necessity of “deferring” to the 
agency’s construction of an ambiguous term or terms at Step Two. 
Instead, the responsibility of defining the terminology falls to the court. 
Step Zero also requires a determination to be made about whether any 
institutional structure or process is legally relevant. At Step Zero, there 
is a judicial analysis of whether Congress actually created 
administrative capacity that an agency could use to resolve the policy 
issues involved in resolving a statutory ambiguity. 
As an example, Justice David Souter in United States v. Mead 
Corp.,126 engaged in a study of the U.S. Customs Service’s practices to 
determine whether tariff classifications were subject to the Chevron 
test. He noted that “[a]ny suggestion that rulings intended to have the 
force of law are being churned out at a rate of 10,000 a year at an 
agency’s 46 scattered offices is simply self-refuting.”127  
Finally, the same focus on whether Congress created the requisite 
institutional capacity arises when a court applies the “major questions” 
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exception, in which a court considers whether Congress intended to 
delegate an “interpretative” issue with significant policy implications 
to an agency.128 In Food and Drug Administration v. Brown and 
Williamson Corp.,129 for example, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor for 
the majority construed the administrative competence of the Food and 
Drug Administration (“FDA”) in narrow terms so that it could only 
act in certain ways when certain evidentiary criteria were fulfilled.130 
The existence of tobacco-specific legislation reinforced this view.131 By 
comparison, Justice Stephen Breyer’s dissent concluded that 
Congress’s intent had been to delegate to the FDA’s competence the 
definition of what products constitute a “drug” for purposes of FDA 
regulation.132 
What these examples highlight is that administrative competence 
is not a byword for deference. Rather highlighting it underscores the 
legal significance of the capacity and authority of any administrative 
institution in questions concerning statutory interpretation. That is 
inevitable given that administrative law is the law of public 
administration. 
VII.  THREE INSIGHTS ABOUT CHEVRON 
Once Chevron is understood as being about administrative 
competence, it is possible to see how understandings of administrative 
competence inform the application of Chevron in all of its varieties. 
Besides being a powerful example of the importance of understanding 
administrative law as the law of public administration, this approach 
opens up three insights about the case law.  
First, it becomes clear that how judges approach Step One is 
influenced by whether they adopt a restrictive or narrow understanding 
of administrative capacity or a more expansive understanding. 
Consider, for example, Environmental Protection Agency v. EME 
Homer City Generation,133 which concerned an EPA rule that 
interpreted the provision of the CAA that addresses an upwind state’s 
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contribution to a downward state’s air pollution.134 Among other 
considerations, the EPA took the cost of abatement into account in 
setting the limitations for an upwind state. The majority, which upheld 
the construction of the statute at the second step of Chevron, 
recognized the complexity of assessing an upwind state contribution 
and that the CAA required “the Agency to address a thorny causation 
problem.”135 As such, the expertise of the EPA was in “crafting” a 
solution to a multifaceted problem.136 After reviewing what the EPA 
did, the majority found it a permissible construction.  
Justice Antonin Scalia, who dissented along with Justice Thomas, 
concluded that the statute was clear on its face and it should be 
resolved at Step One of Chevron.137 This was because he understood 
the EPA’s expertise as one of quantitative assessment,138 which 
involved only calculating limitations on downwind pollution. He noted, 
“I am confident, however, that EPA’s skilled number-crunchers can 
adhere to the statute’s quantitative (rather than efficiency) mandate by 
crafting quantitative solutions.”139 This example highlights that agency 
expertise is not only legally relevant, but that how such expertise is 
understood by judges will figure into how the doctrine is applied. 
Second, understanding the two-step test as a binary choice 
between law and discretion is unhelpful because it draws bright lines 
between law and policy and law and administration. As a result, it 
skews focus away from administrative competence. Although the idea 
that Chevron is about administrative competence is not well-
recognized, scholars have exposed the problems with characterizing 
Chevron as a two-step test.140 One problem is there are now more than 
two steps with the arrival of Step Zero and the “major questions 
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doctrine.” Another is the variable reasoning that judges employ 
regarding these various “steps.” As explained in the last Part, once you 
recognize that Chevron is about administrative competence, the 
various steps have a common starting point. By fully considering 
administrative competence, lawyers can better understand the 
Chevron doctrine with which they have been struggling for so long.  
Finally, the merit of the two-step test concerns how it governs the 
lower courts rather than how it governs administrative action. There is 
nothing new in highlighting this.141 As Professor Richard Pierce 
recently noted, one of the virtues of the two-step test is that “it 
increases the number of federal statutes that have the same meaning 
throughout the country.”142 Likewise, Professor Richard Murphy 
recently argued that there are reasons for overturning Chevron due to 
its doctrinal complexity, but any replacement should acknowledge the 
value of the two-step doctrine in “block[ing] horizontal stare decisis 
from distorting review of the merits of an agency’s statutory 
construction.”143 And Robert Adler and Brian House have pointed out, 
the doctrinal confusion concerning the “Waters of the United States” 
is a case in point.144  
When you understand administrative law as the law of public 
administration, the important and challenging role that a decentralized 
court system has in interacting with administrative competence is 
brought into focus. The issue is less about judicial power versus 
administrative power and more about how Chevron, as a form of 
essential outside-in accountability,145 frames the way in which 
decentralized courts can ensure meaningful accountability. When 
administrative law is understood in binary terms, however, this 
function is hidden.  
Overall, these three insights point to a very different way forward 
for administrative law. It is a way forward in which the development of 
a robust body of precedent is grounded in the institutional reality of 
the subject instead of attempting to draw sharp lines between law and 
administration. In this regard, we are reminded of Professor Jeremy 
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Waldron’s perception about the rule of law. Waldron explains: “We 
want to be ruled thoughtfully. Or to put it in a more democratic idiom, 
we want our engagement in governance to be thoughtful and reasoned, 
rather than rigid and mechanical.”146 Thoughtfulness for Waldron is 
“the capacity to reflect and deliberate, to ponder complexity and 
confront new and unexpected circumstances with an open mind.”147 
The existence of the administrative state with its capacity and 
authority—its competence—is an example of this commitment to 
thoughtfulness. Judicial review in ensuring meaningful accountability 
should promote such thoughtfulness.  
CONCLUSION 
The dispute concerning Chevron is ultimately about the nature of 
law in administrative law, and whether administrative competence 
does and should figure into the administrative law imagination. It is a 
choice between recognizing the reality of the American polity and not 
doing so. The desirable way forward is to accept that reality and ensure 
administrative law is the law of public administration. Not least 
because it ensures that, as lawyers, we do not engage in pretense about 
what is going on in the administrative state.  
But there is a problem. While the history of administrative law is 
rich in ideas of administrative competence, we have seen such 
discourses recede since 1980, resulting in ideas of administrative 
competence that are thin and threadbare. To talk of the legal relevance 
of public administration and administrative competence now appears 
paradoxical. It is just a case of appearances, however. While ideas of 
administrative competence may not animate administrative law 
scholarship, they are clearly present in the case law. As we have shown, 
it is inevitable that the application of the Chevron test is informed by 
understandings of administrative competence.148  
Professor Brian Tamanaha notes that “no existing theory of law 
adequately accounts for government entities that utilize legal 
mechanisms in myriad ways in their activities.”149 Tamanaha is correct 
in one sense. The current binary that dominates administrative law 
reflects a lack of proper engagement with administrative competence. 
The way in which Chevron is commonly understood is Exhibit A. 
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Administrative law is therefore not a true law of public administration, 
and there are attempts to make it less so by those who argue for the 
overruling of Chevron. But Tamanaha is wrong in another sense. 
Chevron implicitly recognizes administrative competence. Likewise, 
there is a rich and varied history of administrative competence in which 
administrative law is entangled. The problem is that in the last forty 
years there has been a narrowing of the administrative law imagination.   
 
